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Abstract
We consider a risk-averse entrepreneur who invests in a project with id-
iosyncratic risk. In contrast to the literature, we assume the entrepreneur is
unable to get a loan from a bank directly because of the low creditability of
the entrepreneur and so an innovative financial contract, named equity-for-
guarantee swap, is signed among a bank, an insurer, and the entrepreneur.
It is shown that the new swap leads to higher leverage, which brings more
diversification and tax benefits. The new swap not only solves the problems
of financing constraints, but also significantly improves the welfare level of
the entrepreneur. The growth of welfare level increases dramatically with
risk aversion index and the volatility of idiosyncratic risk.
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1. Introduction
One of fundamental characteristics of entrepreneurship is lack of diver-
sification. Specifically, the revenue of an entrepreneurial firm (private firm)
suffers systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Entrepreneurs can trade risk-free
bonds and the diversified market portfolio to diversify the systematic busi-
ness risk but not the idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, the diversification benefit
of risky debt is important to entrepreneurs in addition to the standard trade-
off between tax benefits and costs of financial distress, see Chen et al. (2010)
among others.
In addition, there are many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and
fresh graduates every year who are hungry for money to start a new business.
Such investment is generally extremely high-risk, and to compensate for such
risk, the entrepreneur comes with the potential for high returns. However,
due to low credibility and lack of guarantee, many entrepreneurs, let alone
fresh graduates, are unable to get a bank loan or get other debt financing
cheaply. Under such situation, traditional financial theory on optimal cap-
ital structure is not reasonable since the entrepreneur has no other choice
beyond starting her business with her own money only or simply giving up
the business.
To overcome borrowing constraints, some insurers and entrepreneurs in
China have developed an innovative financial product, called equity-for-
guarantee swap (EGS). This is an agreement between a lender (bank), an
insurer, and a borrower (entrepreneur), where the bank lends at a given in-
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terest rate to the entrepreneur and if the entrepreneur defaults on the debt,
the insurer will make a compensatory payment to the creditor so that the
creditor will always be paid up-to a certain guarantee level. In return for the
guarantee, the firm needs to allocate a percentage of the firm’s equity to the
insurer. This contract was first signed in 2002 in China and it has become
increasingly popular in the country.4
In this article, we extend the model established by Chen et al. (2010) to
take into account both idiosyncratic risk and the EGS. This paper relates
to Yang and Zhang (2013), who provide the first formal study on the swap.
However, Yang and Zhang (2013) merely discuss traditional capital struc-
ture issues in the classic framework of Leland (1994). Our model examines
this contract in a more general context with idiosyncratic risk and cash-out
option.
The main results in Chen et al. (2010) are based on the assumption
that the entrepreneur has “deep pockets”, i.e. she can issue debt with the
coupon rate being higher than the project’s revenue since she can inject
cash into the firm to pay coupons. However, this assumption is not feasible
for many entrepreneurs, not to mention fresh graduates. Actually, Chen
et al. (2010) point out that entrepreneurs may be liquidity-constrained, i.e.
no external funds are available to cover the firm’s debt service, and hence
an earlier liquidation will be forced by the creditor. We argue that the
assumption becomes practical thanks to the EGS. In fact, under the swap,
the entrepreneur is equivalent to the one who has deep pockets and the default
4The guarantee in our model shares a few similarities with that in Ju and Sohn (2014),
where the contract is based on a technology credit scoring model.
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threshold can be lower than the coupon level because the claim owned by
the creditor is guaranteed by the insurer. In exchange for the guarantee, the
entrepreneur needs to pay the insurer a proportion of equity of the firm. In
addition, since the insurer guarantees the debt, the creditor under the swap
does not demand a protective covenant.
We consider a risk-averse entrepreneur having access to standard financial
investment opportunities with a chance to invest in a project. The objec-
tive of the entrepreneur is to maximize her expected lifetime utility over
intertemporal consumption. We choose the exponential utility primarily for
analytical tractability. While constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) util-
ity does not capture wealth effects, it reduces the dimension, especially for
the double-barrier boundary problem, see Henderson (2002), Miao and Wang
(2007), Ewald and Yang (2008), and Yang and Yang (2012) among others.5
The main results of the paper are as follows. First, our setting improves a
generalized model of capital structure trade-off among borrowing constraints,
tax, diversification benefits, and costs of financial distress. Second, the EGS
fundamentally raises the entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity and therefore the
entrepreneur optimally issues more debt and takes higher leverage than that
without the swap. Higher leverage leads to larger tax shields and diversi-
fication benefits because the entrepreneur faces less equity exposure to the
5As argued by Miao and Wang (2007) and Chen et al. (2010), it is believed that
our model and insights apply to regular utility functions, since the precautionary savings
effect, which is captured by utility functions with convex marginal utility like CARA, is
the driving force. For this reason and mathematical convenience, we only consider CARA
utility in the paper.
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project and thus her portfolio is less risky. Third, the entrepreneur with the
swap receives more welfare increments and has more investment opportuni-
ties because of being more willing to invest. Higher risk-averse entrepreneurs
under higher nondiversifiable idiosyncratic risk gain more benefits resulting
from the swap.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 solves the model. Section 4 discusses the numerical results. Section 5
concludes. Appendices provide equilibrium valuation of corporate securities.
2. Model setup
2.1. Investment Opportunities
We consider an infinitely-lived risk-averse entrepreneur who has an option
to invest in a take-it-or-leave-it project at present time 0, which requires a
one-time investment cost I. All sources of uncertainty arise from two inde-
pendent standard Brownian motions B and Z defined on a filtered probability
space (Ω,F , {Ft : t ≥ 0},P).
In addition to the project opportunity, the entrepreneur has access to
standard financial investment opportunities, see Merton (1971). Let W de-
note the entrepreneur’s liquid wealth process. The entrepreneur invests an
amount of pit in a diversified market portfolio and the remaining amount
Wt − pit in the risk-free asset with a constant interest rate r. The return of
the diversified market portfolio is denoted by R which satisfies
dRt = µMdt+ σMdBt, (1)
where µM and σM > 0 are constants, and η ≡ (µM − r)/σM is the Sharpe
ratio of the market portfolio.
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We assume the project generates a stochastic revenue process {yt : t ≥ 0}
that follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM):
dyt = µyytdt+ ρσytdBt + ytdZt, y0 given, (2)
where µy is the expected growth rate, σ is the total volatility and ρ ∈ [−1, 1]
is the correlation coefficient between the project payoff and the return on the
market portfolio given by (1). A higher absolute value |ρ| of the correlation
coefficient implies that the systematic volatility has a larger weight, ceteris
paribus. The parameters ω ≡ ρσ and  ≡ √1− ρ2σ are respectively the
systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of the revenue growth.
2.2. Entrepreneurial Financing with Equity-for-Guarantee Swap
We assume that the entrepreneur runs the project by setting up a limited
liability entity, such as a limited liability company (LLC) or an S corporation,
which allows her to face single-layer taxation for her business income and
makes the debt nonrecourse. We follow the simple tax system in Chen et al.
(2010). Entrepreneurial business profits incur taxes at a rate τe. A public
firm is subject to a double taxation which is captured by an effective marginal
tax rate τm. The capital gains upon cash-out are taxed at a rate τg.
The entrepreneur finances the initial one-time lump-sum cost I via her
own funds and external financing. We assume that the main source of exter-
nal financing is debt, e.g. bank loans. Due to the high default probability and
relative lack of collateral, it is much more difficult for the entrepreneurial firm
to take debt financing than for a large company. Unlike Chen et al. (2010)
who do not consider borrowing constraints, we study the entrepreneur who
is constrained in borrowing due to protected covenants demanded by the
6
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lenders. This financing constraint is alleviated by introducing the EGS sup-
ported by a commercial guarantee company or insurer. Unlike the traditional
credit hypothecation, though, the entrepreneurial firm in the new credit guar-
antee scheme must pay to the guarantee company a portion (ϕ) of equity as
guarantee costs instead of regular guarantee fees.
Under the guarantee, the entrepreneur chooses to issue an interest-only
consol with coupon b and par value F0 = F (y0) at time 0 and remains
unchanged until the entrepreneur exits from the project, see (A.9) and (A.11).
After the debt is in place, at any time t ≥ 0, the entrepreneur has three
choices: (1) She runs the firm and receives a fraction (1−ϕ) of cash payments
from the firm; (2) She defaults once the default threshold yd of the revenue
process is reached and then the insurer must make a compensatory payment
to the creditor so that the creditor is paid up-to a certain guarantee level;
(3) She cashes out by selling the firm to a diversified buyer at the cash-out
threshold yu, which incurs a fixed transaction cost K.
Once the entrepreneur defaults, the debt holders (lenders) take control
and liquidate/sell the firm. Bankruptcy ex post is costly and the bankruptcy
loss can be interpreted in different ways, such as loss from selling real as-
sets, asset fire-sale losses, legal fees, etc. We assume that κ ≡ 1 − α is the
bankruptcy loss rate, i.e. α is the recovery rate. Then the remaining liquida-
tion/sale value of the firm is equal to αA(yd), where A(yd) is the equilibrium
value of an unlevered (all-equity without debt) public firm given by (A.1).
Moreover, the debt holders will gain the compensatory payment from the
guarantee company so that under the arrangement of equity-for-guarantee
contract the debt holders gain φb/r once the entrepreneur defaults instead of
7
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the remaining value αA(yd) only, where φ is the guarantee level. Therefore,
the value, denoted by Pguar, of the compensatory payment is given by
Pguar = (
φb
r
− αA(yd))q(y), (3)
where q(y) is the value of a security that claims one unit of account at the
default time. It is (A.2) for the default option only and (A.7) for the case
with the cash-out option as well.
While selling the firm to cash out, the entrepreneur needs to retire the
firm’s debt obligation at par F0 given by (A.11). Similar to Chen et al. (2010),
we assume that the buyer is well diversified who will optimally relever the
firm, see Leland (1994). The value of the firm after sale is the value of an
optimally levered firm in the complete market, i.e. V ∗(yu) given by (A.6).
Let T be the set of {Ft : t ≥ 0}-stopping times. An investor is charac-
terized by her initial wealth W0, a time-discount rate β and her preference
U(·). She seeks to choose the default timing Td ∈ T and cash-out timing
Tu ∈ T , a bond coupon b and a consumption process c so as to maximize her
expected lifetime time-additive utility of consumption:
E
[∫ ∞
0
exp (−βs)U(cs)ds
]
. (4)
In the following text, thanks to the justification argued in the last section,
we assume the utility function in (4) is a CARA utility, i.e.
U(c) = − exp(−γc)/γ, c ∈ <,
where γ > 0 is the absolute risk aversion parameter.
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3. Model Solution
In this section, we analyze the entrepreneur’s optimal decisions under
borrowing constraints and the EGS. We note that the entrepreneur’s problem
is significantly different from that considered by Chen et al. (2010). In fact,
the problem here is much more challenging than Chen et al. (2010) since
the guarantee cost depends on both the default threshold and the cash-out
threshold, which conversely depend on the guarantee cost at the same time.
Firstly, we solve the standard Merton consumption and portfolio choice
problem faced by the entrepreneur, see Merton (1971), after she exits from her
business via either cashing out or defaulting. Secondly, we solve a mixture of
optimal control and optimal stopping problem. We derive the guarantee cost,
which is a function of the default threshold yd and the cash-out threshold yu.
Then, for any given yd and yu, we find the maximum for
E
[∫ τD
0
exp (−βs)U(cs)ds+ exp(−τD)Je(WτD)
]
, yd ≤ y0 ≤ yu, (5)
where D = {(w, y) ∈ <2|yd ≤ y ≤ yu}, τD ≡ inf{t ≥ 0|(Wt, yt) /∈ D} =
min{Td, Tu}, and the function Je(·) is derived by solving the Merton prob-
lem given by (7) below. The maximum of (5) is also a function of the default
threshold yd and the cash-out threshold yu. Therefore, we need to solve a
constrained nonlinear programming problem to obtain the optimal default
threshold y∗d and the cash-out threshold y
∗
u. Finally, we determine the en-
trepreneur’s initial investment and optimal capital structure.
3.1. Guarantee Costs and Equity-for-Guarantee Swaps
Unlike the traditional credit hypothecation, though, the entrepreneurial
firm in the new credit guarantee scheme must pay to the guarantee company
9
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a portion (ϕ) of equity instead of regular guarantee fees. Thus, we call ϕ the
guarantee cost of the EGS.
Generally, a guarantee company is usually a diversified investor who signs
such contracts with a large number of firms and therefore the idiosyncratic
risk of a entrepreneurship firm is well-diversified. This means that, in addi-
tion to (3), the value Pguar of compensatory payment must be equal to the
market value of the equity allocated to the insurer. That is
Pguar = ϕE0(y; yd, yu), (6)
where E0(y; yd, yu) is the market value of the outside equity held by the
insurer and it is given by (A.4) if the cash-out option is prohibited and given
by (A.10) if the cash-out option is admissible.
Therefore, combining (3) and (6) gives the guarantee cost ϕ as follows
ϕ ≡ ϕ(y; yd, yu) =
(
φb
r
− αA(yd)
)
q(y)/E0(y; yd, yu)
=
(φbr −α(1−τm)
yd
r−µ)q(y)
(1−τe)( yr−µ− br )−(1−τe)(
yd
r−µ− br )q(y)+[V ∗(yu)−(1−τe)(
yd
r−µ− br )]q¯(y)
,
where V ∗(y), q(y) and q¯(y) are defined in (A.6), (A.7) and (A.8).
Remark 1. The guarantee cost here is fundamentally different from that
given by Yang and Zhang (2013), which does not take into account that the
entrepreneur is a risk-averse individual and has the option to cash out. For
this reason, thanks to game theory, the equilibrium value of equity must be
related to the entrepreneur’s decisions on the cash-out option and a default
threshold, which is clearly different from that in Yang and Zhang (2013) based
on a risk-neutral world.
10
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
3.2. Consumption and Portfolio Choice after Exit
After exiting from her business, the entrepreneur lives on her own financial
wealth and faces the standard consumption and portfolio choice problem in
Merton (1971). The maximum of the expected lifetime time-additive utility
of consumption is given by
Je(w) = − 1
γr
exp
[
−γr
(
w +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)]
. (7)
3.3. Entrepreneur’s Decisions and Utility Indifference Prices
Before exit, the entrepreneur’s financial wealth evolves as follows,
dWt = (rWt+pit(µM−r)+(1−τe)(1−ϕ)(y−b)−ct)dt+pitσMdBt, 0 < t < τD.
(8)
Compared to the exogenously given fraction of equity retained by the en-
trepreneur in Chen et al. (2010), the fraction 1 − ϕ here is endogenously
determined by the EGS, which depends on the entrepreneur’s decisions on
default and cash-out. For this reason, we first solve the optimization prob-
lem (5) for any given exit threshold pair (yd, yu). Under this case, the en-
trepreneur’s value function Js(w, y) satisfies the following Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation according to Bellman’s principle of optimality:
sup
c≥0,pi
{U(c) + (rw + pi(µM − r) + (1− τe)(1− ϕ)(y − b)− c)Jsw(w, y)
+ (piσM )
2
2
Jsww(w, y) + piσMσρyJ
s
wy(w, y) + µyyJ
s
y(w, y) +
σ2y2
2
Jsyy(w, y)
−βJs(w, y)} = 0,
(9)
with the value-matching conditions
Js(w, yd) = J
e(w), (10)
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Js(w, yu) = J
e(w+(1−ϕ)V ∗(yu)−F0−K−τg((1−ϕ)V ∗(yu)−K−I)). (11)
According to utility indifference pricing principle, for the current revenue
yd < y < yu, the utility indifference price (also called subjective value)
6 of
equity owned by the entrepreneur, denoted by G(y), satisfies
Js(w, y) = Je(w +G(y)) = − 1
γr
exp
[
−γr
(
w +G(y) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)]
.
(12)
Substituting (7) and (12) into (9) - (11), according to the first-order condi-
tions for the optimal consumption and portfolio choice, we obtain the follow-
ing theorem immediately:
Theorem 3.1. The entrepreneur exits from her business when the revenue
process {yt : t ≥ 0} reaches either the default threshold yd or the cash-out
threshold yu, whichever comes first. For any given exit threshold pair (yd, yu),
liquid wealth level w and revenue yd < y < yu, the optimal consumption and
portfolio rule is given by
c∗(w, y) = r
[
w +G(y) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
]
, (13)
pi∗(w, y) =
η
γrσM
− ρσ
σM
yG′(y), (14)
where G(y) is the utility indifference price of equity owned by the entrepreneur
and is a solution of the following ordinary differential equation:
rG(y) = (1− τe)(1− ϕ)(y − b) + (µy − ρση)yG′(y)
+σ
2y2
2
G′′(y)− γr(1−ρ2)σ2y2
2
G′(y)2,
(15)
6Thanks to the exponential utility assumption, the utility indifference price is indepen-
dent of the wealth level of the entrepreneur.
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subject to the boundary conditions:
G(yd) = 0, (16)
G(yu) = (1− ϕ)V ∗(yu)− F0 −K − τg((1− ϕ)V ∗(yu)−K − I). (17)
In order to complete the computation of the entrepreneur’s optimization
problem, we now need to derive the optimal default threshold y∗d and optimal
cash-out threshold y∗u, such that the value function J
s(w, y) is maximized.
Equivalently, we need only to find the maximum point (y∗d, y
∗
u) of the function
G(y; yd, yu) for any given revenue level
7. The constrained nonlinear program-
ming problem is solved by numerical methods.
Remark 2. At first sight, this theorem is similar to Chen et al. (2010), but
the fraction 1 − ϕ of equity owned by the entrepreneur here is endogenously
determined under the newly invented EGS. As a result, one of the distinc-
tions from Chen et al. (2010) is that the state transition equation (8) itself
depends on the optimal stopping times. Therefore, to derive the optimal de-
fault threshold and cash-out threshold more effectively, we solve a nonlinear
programming problem instead of utilizing the smooth-pasting conditions as
done by Chen et al. (2010).
Similar to Chen et al. (2010), Equation (15) implies that the systematic
and idiosyncratic risk premium denoted by ξs(y) and ξi(y) respectively, are
ξs(y) = ρσηy
G′(y)
G(y)
, (18)
7Obviously, the maximum point will not depend on the current revenue level in our
model. Thus we find the maximum point at y0 = 1, and we set the constraint (0, y0)
′ ≤
(yd, yu)
′ ≤ (y0, y¯)′, where y¯ is a sufficiently large boundary to include y∗u.
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ξi(y) =
γr
2
(
√
1− ρ2σyG′(y))2
G(y)
. (19)
3.4. Capital Structure under Equity-for-Guarantee Swap
Now we turn to the entrepreneur’s initial decision on the optimal debt
borrowed from the lender for investing in the project in order to maximize
the entrepreneur’s net profit under the EGS.
The entrepreneur’s initial optimal capital structure to start the project
is to find optimal coupon level b∗, which maximizes the entrepreneur’s net
profit (target function)
P (y0; b, I) ≡ G(y0) + [F (y0)− I]. (20)
We identify a break-even investment cost I∗ by solving a root-finding problem
P ∗(y0; b∗, I∗) = 0.
Denote by Pˆ ∗(y0) the maximum net profit obtained by an entrepreneur
without signing an EGS contract, and by W s(y0) the welfare loss of this
entrepreneur because the swap is not signed, and then we have
W s(y0) ≡ P ∗(y0)− Pˆ ∗(y0).
After the entrepreneur invests in the project, a natural measure of lever-
age for the entrepreneur is the private leverage ratio L(y0) ≡ F (y0)/S(y0),
where S(y0) is the total subjective value of the entrepreneurial firm. In con-
trast to Chen et al. (2010), the total subjective value in our model is given
by S(y0) = G(y0)+F (y0), which excludes the value ϕE0 of the outside equity
held by the insurer because the value of the outside debt held by the lender
is already taken into account.
14
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4. Discussion of Entrepreneurial Finance
To make an effective comparison, similar to Chen et al. (2010), our base-
line parameter values are carefully selected. For example, we select the pa-
rameter values that ensure yd < y0 < yu. I.e., we excludes two uninteresting
cases: One corresponds to a sufficiently large asset recovery rate α, together
with a sufficiently high guarantee level φ and a large risk aversion γ, which
might lead to an immediate default; The other corresponds to a sufficiently
small cash-out cost K, which might make the entrepreneur sell the firm im-
mediately.
Our numerical simulations are based on the following annualized base-
line parameter values: interest rate r = 3%, expected growth rate µy = 4%,
the Sharpe ratio of market η = 0.4, asset recovery rate α = 0.6. The en-
trepreneur’s rate of time preference is β = 3% and the initial level of the
project revenue is y0 = 1. The initial investment cost for the project is
I = 10 and the cash-out cost is K = 27. The effective marginal tax rate τm
is 11.29%. The tax rate τe of entrepreneurial firm is set to equal τm for em-
phasizing the entrepreneur’s nondiversifiable idiosyncratic risk. The effective
capital gains tax rate is τg = 10%. In addition, we set the guarantee level
φ = 50%, the systematic volatility of growth rate ω = 10%, and idiosyncratic
volatility  = 10%. Hence, the total volatility of the project σ = 0.020.5, cor-
relation coefficient ρ = 0.50.5. In fact, except for φ, these baseline values
are also assumed in Chen et al. (2010), who justify why the values are so
selected.
At the very beginning, a sensitivity analysis of G(y) and G′(y) is provided
in Table 1.
15
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Table 1: The table presents the sensitivity analysis of the subjective
value G(y) and its derivative G′(y) to the changes of guarantee level
φ, idiosyncratic volatility , and cash-out cost K for risk aversion
γ = 1 and the current project revenue y0 = 1.
φ 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70
G(y) 12.96 10.60 9.76 3.40 1.38 0.87 0.50
G′(y) 21.86 20.59 19.81 11.17 5.69 3.68 2.95
 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
G(y) 18.16 16.37 9.76 3.92 3.63 3.20 3.16
G′(y) 28.72 26.20 19.81 11.16 9.44 7.83 7.17
K 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00
G(y) 10.02 9.80 9.75 9.72 9.71 9.70 9.70
G′(y) 20.27 19.90 19.78 19.73 19.70 19.69 19.68
4.1. Equity Value with Equity-for-Guarantee Swap
We apply Figure 1 to illustrate the properties of the utility indifference
price G of equity, i.e. the value of the cash flow (1−τe)(1−ϕ)(y−b), received
by the entrepreneur with the EGS. Figure 1 shows the results under the case
of default option only and under the case with both default option and cash-
out option respectively. After that, we present the risk premiums demanded
by the entrepreneur in Figure 2. Here we let τe = 0 to exclude the effects of
tax.
The results in Figure 1 under the EGS are similar to Chen et al. (2010)
if we think the amount of equity allocated to the insurer in our model as
the outside equity in Chen et al. (2010), who do not take into account the
16
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Figure 1: The figure depicts the utility indifference price G(y), its derivatives G′(y) and
the value of going public under EGS when risk aversion γ = 1, firm tax τe = 0, interest rate
r = 3%, growth rate µy = 4%, Sharpe ratio η = 0.4, recovery rate α = 0.6, time preference
β = 3%, initial revenue y0 = 1, investment cost I = 10, cash-out cost K = 27, guarantee
level φ = 50%, systematic volatility ω = 10%, and idiosyncratic volatility  = 10%.
swap. The subjective values G(y) of equity are convex functions of revenue
y when it is sufficiently low, i.e. the default option is deep in the money, or
it is sufficiently high, i.e. the cash-out option is deep in the money. Under
other situations, the subjective values are concave because the precautionary
saving demand dominates the impact of the two options.
The properties of risk premium demanded by the entrepreneur shown in
Figure 2 are similar to Chen et al. (2010) as well. On the one hand, when the
revenue y approaches default threshold yd, the systematic risk premium ξ
s(y)
diverges to infinity as seen in (18) because of the significant leverage effect.
It rises when the revenue y approaches the cash-out threshold yu because
the cash-out option makes the value G more sensitive to cash flow shocks.
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Figure 2: This figure shows the systematic and idiosyncratic risk premium under EGS
when firm tax τe = 0, interest rate r = 3%, growth rate µy = 4%, Sharpe ratio η = 0.4,
recovery rate α = 0.6, time preference β = 3%, initial revenue y0 = 1, investment cost
I = 10, cash-out cost K = 27, guarantee level φ = 50%, systematic volatility ω = 10%,
and idiosyncratic volatility  = 10%.
On the other hand, the idiosyncratic risk premium ξi(y) is small when y is
close to yd. When revenue y is large, its growth leads to a fast growth of
ξi(y) because the conditional idiosyncratic variance (
√
1− ρ2σyG′(y))2 rises
faster than G(y), as seen in (19).
4.2. Comparison of Capital Structures
We compare three capital structures under different financing arrange-
ments in Table 2 without taxes τe = 0 and in Table 3 with taxes τe = τm =
11.29% respectively. In Tables 2 and 3, Panel A represents the unlevered en-
trepreneurial firm; Panel B is the entrepreneur who is able to choose optimal
risky debt but is unable to determine optimal default due to the protective
covenant yd = b; Panel C exhibits the entrepreneurial firm with optimal
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leverage and optimal default supported by the EGS. Table 2 shows the spe-
cial case where entrepreneurs acquire only diversification benefits without
tax benefits from risky debt.
Similar conclusions to Chen et al. (2010) are found from the two tables.
First, the model is equivalent to the complete-market benchmark when the
risk aversion γ → 0 and τe = 0, and hence the firm is valued at the mar-
ket value 33.33. Second, the subjective value for a risk-averse entrepreneur
decreases because they discount the nontradable equity due to nondiversifi-
able idiosyncratic business risks. Third, more risk-averse entrepreneurs issue
more debt in order to achieve greater diversification benefits, and as a result,
it leads to a less subjective value of equity held by the entrepreneur.
More importantly, our results reveal large increased benefits for the en-
trepreneur through introducing the EGS. Under this swap, the entrepreneur
is not forced to default by the protective covenant even when the revenue y
is lower than the coupon b. Accordingly, the entrepreneur is able to choose
the endogenous optimal default threshold yd that is generally lower than b.
In other words, thanks to the swap, the entrepreneur has deep pockets now
without liquidity constraints, which is an assumption widely applied by Chen
et al. (2010). For this reason, we argue that the EGS in our model makes
the important assumption in Chen et al. (2010) feasible.
Admittedly, the entrepreneur with the swap faces higher credit spreads
and default probabilities due to higher optimal leverage if the debt is guar-
anteed by only φ = 50% level, i.e. the insurer only ensures that the debt
holder receives 50% of the value b/r. Certainly, credit spreads and default
probabilities can be reduced by raising the guarantee level φ if it is agreed
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Table 2: The table gives guarantee cost ϕ∗, optimal coupon b, debt value F0, equilib-
rium value ϕE0 of equity held by the insurer, subjective value G0 of equity held by the
entrepreneur, optimal leverage L0, credit spread CS, 10 years default probability pd(10),
10 years cash-out probability pu(10), and welfare loss W
s under the tax rate τe = 0 for
risk aversion γ = 0, 1, 2 respectively.
γ ϕ∗ b F0 ϕE0 G0 L0 CS pd(10) pu(10) W s
(%) (%) (bp) (%) (%)
Panel A: without guarantee, no leverage
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.34
2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 26.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.09 0.54
Panel B: without guarantee, optimal leverage and yd = b
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 0.00 0.05 1.65 0.00 27.05 5.75 2.89 0.00 0.04 0.08
2.00 0.00 0.11 3.57 0.00 22.92 13.46 8.35 0.00 0.60 0.15
Panel C: with guarantee, optimal leverage and optimal default
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 0.05 0.13 4.48 0.01 24.30 15.57 1.25 0.00 0.04 0.00
2.00 0.73 0.29 9.11 0.18 17.53 34.19 16.81 0.00 0.60 0.00
by the three parties. However, a higher guarantee level φ demands that the
entrepreneur should pay a higher portion of equity to the insurer in exchange
for the guarantee. If the portion is greater than or equal to one, then it means
that no insurer wants to sign the swap contract with the entrepreneur.
From Tables 2 and 3, thanks to the EGS, the entrepreneur with the
guarantee achieves a considerable welfare increment, i.e. the welfare losses
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Table 3: This table gives guarantee cost ϕ∗, optimal coupon b, debt value F0, equilibrium
value ϕE0 of equity held by the insurer, subjective value G0 of equity held by the en-
trepreneur, optimal leverage L0, credit spread CS, 10 years default probability pd(10), 10
years cash-out probability pu(10), and welfare loss W
s under the tax rate τe = τm = 11.29%
for risk aversion γ = 0, 1, 2 respectively.
γ ϕ∗ b F0 ϕE0 G0 L0 CS pd(10) pu(10) W s
(%) (%) (bp) (%) (%)
Panel A: without guarantee, no leverage
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 29.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.52
2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 2.43
Panel B: without guarantee, optimal leverage and yd = b
0.00 0.00 0.18 5.85 0.00 24.07 19.54 16.43 0.00 0.00 0.44
1.00 0.00 0.20 6.42 0.00 19.79 24.49 19.32 0.00 0.21 1.08
2.00 0.00 0.24 7.53 0.00 16.87 30.88 25.21 0.02 1.28 1.97
Panel C: with guarantee, optimal leverage and optimal default
0.00 3.14 0.46 14.02 0.53 16.33 46.21 30.79 0.05 0.00 0.00
1.00 7.17 0.61 17.53 0.99 9.76 64.24 49.46 0.55 0.10 0.00
2.00 21.10 0.84 21.72 1.99 4.64 82.39 84.53 4.93 0.21 0.00
W s of the entrepreneurs without the guarantee are significant. The welfare
increment is enlarged by a higher tax rate and a higher risk-aversion index of
the entrepreneur. In particular, the welfare increment gets even more relative
to the case of no leverage, which is particularly common in China among
others, since a large number of entrepreneurs of SMEs are fundamentally
unable to issue debt directly.
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4.3. Analysis of Welfare Loss
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Figure 3: The figure reports how welfare loss W s changes with idiosyncratic volatilities
 and guarantee levels φ when firm tax τe = 11.29%, interest rate r = 3%, growth rate
µy = 4%, Sharpe ratio η = 0.4, recovery rate α = 0.6, time preference β = 3%, initial
revenue y0 = 1, investment cost I = 10, cash-out cost K = 27, and systematic volatility
ω = 10%.
To demonstrate the increased benefits resulting from the EGS for the
entrepreneur further, we present comparative statics on welfare loss W s for
different parameter values in Figures 3 and 4. We only show the results of
welfare loss W s incurred by the entrepreneur without leverage due to the
pervasive low borrowing capacity of an SME. The findings on W s of the
entrepreneur with the protective covenant are similar.
Figures 3 and 4 highlight large benefits resulting from the EGS. Com-
pared with the unlevered firm, the swap raises net profit, and the welfare
increment ascends for more risk-averse entrepreneurs who optimally take
higher leverage. First, for a risk-averse entrepreneur, the welfare loss W s
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Figure 4: This figure presents how welfare loss W s changes with the cash-out costs K
and correlation ρ when firm tax τe = 11.29%, interest rate r = 3%, growth rate µy = 4%,
Sharpe ratio η = 0.4, recovery rate α = 0.6, time preference β = 3%, initial revenue
y0 = 1, investment cost I = 10, guarantee level φ = 50%, systematic volatility ω = 10%,
and idiosyncratic volatility  = 10%.
increases substantially with the idiosyncratic volatility  and the guarantee
level φ. Second, if the cash-out cost K is small, the welfare loss W s increases
quickly with K for a sufficiently risk-averse entrepreneur, and then keep un-
changed if K is sufficiently large. It also shows that the welfare increment
increases quickly with the risk-aversion index and does not depend on the
cash-out cost if the cost is sufficiently large. Finally, the welfare loss W s
decreases with the correlation coefficient ρ since a large absolute value of ρ
means a less idiosyncratic risk, keeping parameter σ unchanged.
4.4. Break-even Investment Cost
The previous subsections explore the benefits of the EGS in financing
decisions. Now we focus on the effects of the swap on an entrepreneur’s
23
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
investment decisions. Chen et al. (2010) examine the effects of idiosyncratic
volatility  ∈ {0.15, 0.20, 0.25} on the break-even investment cost I∗. Here
we provide more detailed analysis on the cut-off rule I∗ and emphasize the
benefits of the swap.
We compare the break-even cost I∗ under three different capital struc-
tures, i.e. no leverage without the swap, optimal leverage with bankruptcy
protection but without the EGS, and the optimal capital structure with the
swap. As reported in Table 4, generally the break-even investment cost I∗
decreases for a more risk-averse entrepreneur and/or a higher idiosyncratic
volatility of the revenue. I.e., a high risk aversion reduces the likelihood to
invest, which is consistent with the observations of Chonopoulos et al. (2011).
For instance, if  = 0.90, the entrepreneur with γ = 0 under the swap (Panel
C) will invest in the project even the investment cost is as much as 27.26. By
contrast, if the entrepreneur is risk-averse enough, say γ = 2, she will give
up the project once the investment cost is greater than 21.55.
However, the trend of I∗ does not hold true all the time. In fact, we
notice that in Panels B and C of Table 4, as idiosyncratic volatility  grows
further, break-even investment costs fluctuate slightly. This is because the
subjective values of equity held by the entrepreneur include the values of the
default option and the cash-out option, both of which increase with a growth
of the volatility of idiosyncratic risk although for a risk-averse investor, the
subjective value of larger risk asset will be less in general.
In addition, we find that in Panel B under risk aversion γ = 2, the break-
even investment cost is higher than that under γ = 1 if the volatility of
idiosyncratic risk is large enough, say  ≥ 0.4. This is because a more risk-
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averse entrepreneur would borrow more money from the bank and get more
diversified benefits and tax shields under bankruptcy protection yd = b.
Table 4: This table gives break-even investment cost I∗ under tax rate τe = τm = 11.29%
for different volatility  of idiosyncratic risk and risk aversion γ = 0, 1, 2 respectively.
 = 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
Panel A: without guarantee, no leverage
0.00 29.51 29.17 28.59 28.00 27.52 27.15 26.87 26.66 26.50
1.00 25.78 20.99 17.83 15.92 14.73 13.98 13.48 13.12 12.86
2.00 23.94 18.44 15.18 13.30 12.14 11.37 10.92 10.60 10.37
Panel B: without guarantee, optimal leverage and yd = b
0.00 29.97 29.39 28.78 28.14 27.63 27.24 26.96 26.74 26.58
1.00 26.29 21.31 18.04 17.61 17.78 17.73 17.70 17.68 17.66
2.00 24.49 18.68 17.71 17.84 17.81 17.80 17.79 17.78 17.77
Panel C: with guarantee, optimal leverage and optimal default
0.00 30.35 29.69 28.97 28.51 28.20 27.55 27.51 27.35 27.26
1.00 27.29 25.42 24.43 23.69 23.65 22.56 22.92 22.93 22.69
2.00 26.36 24.90 23.10 22.78 22.24 21.97 21.58 21.52 21.55
Actually, under the EGS, the break-even investment cost of a more risk-
averse entrepreneur decreases gradually and it is considerably greater than
the corresponding break-even investment cost if the swap contract is not
signed. These results imply that an entrepreneur armed with the swap is
more willing to invest, since the swap provides the entrepreneur with the
eligibility to issue debt and to freely choose the time to default.
More importantly, a high break-even investment cost means a large net
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profit obtained by the entrepreneur after investing in the project. By com-
paring the three financing schemes in Table 4, we find that a risk-averse en-
trepreneur obtains considerable welfare increments resulting from the EGS,
although the welfare increments are very limited if the entrepreneur’s risk
aversion γ = 0.
5. Conclusion
Usually, it is difficult or even impossible for SMEs to get bank loan to
start a new business because of low credibility and lack of guarantee, even if
the business is substantially profitable. There are a large number of SMEs
encountering such obstacles. Moreover, a great number of students graduate
from college every year (e.g. record-high 6.99 million in China in 2013),
and with the increasingly serious employment situation, many governments
encourage them to start their own businesses. Clearly all of them need funds,
which in general cannot be borrowed directly from a bank. In order to
overcome such financing constraints, a financial product, called equity-for-
guarantee swap (EGS), which was invented in China since 2002, is becoming
more and more popular. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
quantitative study on such swaps apart from Yang and Zhang (2013), who
consider only the equilibrium pricing problem for a firm with the swap.
This paper provides a dynamic incomplete-market framework that mod-
els the impact and interactions of the two frictions: borrowing constraints
and lack of diversification, on entrepreneurial investment, interdependent
consumption, portfolio allocation, financing, and business exit decisions. We
show that the EGS brings great benefits to the entrepreneur. The swap
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improves the capital structure trade-off among tax, diversification benefit
and financial distress costs. Hence, issuing covered risky debt generates sub-
stantial diversification benefits and tax benefits. The more risk-averse the
entrepreneur, or the higher the idiosyncratic risk, the greater the benefit.
Naturally, the most important advantage of the newly invented swap is to ef-
fectively overcome borrowing constraints on an entrepreneur, who are unable
to invest in a project without the swap, even though the project is valuable.
Appendices
Appendix A An Equilibrium Valuation of Corporate Securities
Denote by ν ≡ µy − ρση the risk-adjusted drift rate of the project, and
BQ a standard Brownian motion under an equivalent risk-neutral probability
measure Q, satisfying dBQt = dBt + ηdt. Under Q, the dynamics of the
revenue in (2) can be rewritten as8
dyt = νytdt+ ρσytdB
Q
t + ytdZt, y0 given.
Then one can derive the following equilibrium price (value)
V f (y) = EQ
[∫ ∞
t
exp (−r(s− t)) f(ys)ds |yt = y
]
for any time-independent claim underlying the revenue y of the project with
a payment flow f(ys) to the claimant. Therefore, the value A(y) of the
8Noting that Z is independent of B, we conclude from the equilibrium pricing theory
and the well-known Girsanov theorem, that Z is a standard Brownian motion under both
Q and the physical probability measure.
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unlevered firm is immediately given by
A(y) = EQ
[∫ ∞
t
exp (−r(s− t)) (1− τm)ysds |yt = y
]
= (1− τm) y
r − ν .
(A.1)
Denote by θ1 and θ2 the two roots of the quadratic equation
1
2
σ2θ(θ − 1) +
νθ − r = 0, then we get
θ1,2 =
−(ν − σ2/2)∓√(ν − σ2/2)2 + 2rσ2
σ2
.
Obviously, we have θ1 < 0 and θ2 > 1.
Define τd = inf{t ≥ 0 : yt ≤ yd} and denote by qd(y) the value of a
security that claims one unit of account at the default time without cash-out
option, then
q
d
(y) = EQ[e−r(τd−t)|yt = y] =
(
y
yd
)θ1
. (A.2)
Thus, the equilibrium value of equity of a levered public firm is given by
E(y) = EQ
[∫ τd
t
e−r(s−t)(1− τm)(ys − b)ds |yt = y
]
= (1− τm)
(
y
r − ν −
b
r
)
− (1− τm)
(
yd
r − ν −
b
r
)
q
d
(y). (A.3)
Naturally, the market value of the outside equity held by the insurer without
cash-out option is given by
E0(y; yd) = (1− τe)
(
y
r − ν −
b
r
)
− (1− τe)
(
yd
r − ν −
b
r
)
q
d
(y). (A.4)
The default threshold ypd of a levered public firm is given by
ypd =
θ1
θ1 − 1
(r − ν)b
r
.
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The value of the debt D(y) of the public firm is given by
D(y) = EQ
[∫ τd
t
e−r(s−t)bds+
∫ ∞
τd
e−r(s−t)α(1− τm)ysds |yt = y
]
=
b
r
(
1−
(
y
yd
)θ1)
+ αA(yd)
(
y
yd
)θ1
. (A.5)
Then, the sum of E(y) in (A.3) and D(y) in (A.5) gives the firm value V (y).
The optimal coupon b∗ is the solution of b∗ = arg max
b
V (y). Then, the public
firm value under the optimal capital structure is given from Chen et al. (2010)
by
V ∗(y) =
[
1− τm + τm
(
1− θ1 − κ(1− τm)θ1
τm
)1/θ1] y
r − ν , (A.6)
which is the value of the firm when the entrepreneur exercises cash-out option.
Finally, we summarize the market values of outside debt F (y) and equity
E0(y; yd, yu) of the entrepreneurial firm with cash-out option. Denote by q(y)
(resp. q¯(y)) the market value of a security that claims one unit of account at
the default time before cash-out (resp. when cash-out occurs before default).
They are given by
q(y) =
yθ2yu
θ1 − yθ1yuθ2
yuθ1ydθ2 − yuθ2ydθ1 , (A.7)
q¯(y) =
yθ1yd
θ2 − yθ2ydθ1
yuθ1ydθ2 − yuθ2ydθ1 . (A.8)
At the default trigger yd, debt was guaranteed with level φ, in that
F (yd) = φ
b
r
, and the shareholder gets E0(yd) = 0. At the cash-out trig-
ger yu, debt is retired and recovers to F (yu) = F0, and the equity value
E0(yu) = V
∗(yu). We have
F (y) =
b
r
+
(
F0 − b
r
)
q¯(y) + (φ− 1) b
r
q(y), (A.9)
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E0(y; yd, yu) = (1− τe)
(
y
r−ν − br
)− (1− τe) ( ydr−ν − br) q(y)
+
[
V ∗(yu)− (1− τe)
(
yd
r−ν − br
)]
q¯(y).
(A.10)
Then, solving the equation F0 = F (y0) gives the following value of the initial
outside debt:
F0 =
b
r
+ (φ− 1) b
r
q(y0)
1− q¯(y0) . (A.11)
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